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Fraud and Deceit-Rescission of Contract-Scienter as Element
The defendant, a real estate broker, induced the plaintiff to buy a
stone veneer house by falsely representing it to be a genuine stone
house, perfectly constructed. The plaintiff sued for damages and to
rescind the contract. The jury found that the defendant had no
knowledge of the falsity of his representations. Held, that defend-
ant's want of scienter precludes a recovery on either count.'
The English View
The law of England is settled that an action of deceit cannot be
maintained unless the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of his
representation, i.e., unless the defendant was a conscious liar.2 A
particular mental attitude is the main essential of liability.8 But it is
well established that for purposes of rescission this question is wholly
immaterial. 4 The rationale of this distinction is subject to exception.
Both remedies are designed to put the parties back in statu quo,-gen-
erally and so far as money can do it, in the one case; specifically and
exactly in the other. It is difficult to see why the victim of an
innocent untruth should not be entitled to compensation, since he can
get no greater damages than he would be entitled to if the action were
for breach of warranty or contract. Furthermore, from the point of
view of the representee, the injury to him is the same, whatever the
motive of the representor was. 5
The American Views
A majority of American jurisdictions follow the English law in
both particulars,6 and the distinction has been defended by many legal
writers.7 The equity rule, requiring no scienter for the purpose of
rescission, is almost universally established,8 but there has been much
1Ebbs v. Trust Co., 199 N. C. 242, 153 S. E. 858 (1930).
'Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
'Jenks, On Negligence and Deceit in the Law of Torts (1910) 26 L. Q.
Rav. 159, 166.
' Derry v. Peek, supra note 2, 359; Re Metropolitan Coal Consumers' Assn.,
Wainwright's Case, 63 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 427 (1890); BowER, ACTIONABLE
MISREPRESENTATrON (1911) §250.5 Ibid., §§471, 472.
'Halsey v. Minn.-S. C. Land and Timber Co., 28 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A.
4th, 1928).2 BLAcx, REcissION AND CANCELLATION (1916) §102. Distinct and sep-
arate theories. 2 LAWRENCE, EQUIrY JURISPRUDENCE (1928) §842. In equity
the emphasis shifts from wrongful act of defendant to injury to plaintiff.
2 POmEROY, EQurUIT JURISPRUDEN E (4th ed., 1918) §885. Actual fraud in
equity not necessarily immoral; also constructive fraud basis.
'BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, §102.
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divergence and modification of the rule requiring scienter in an action
of deceit.
A minority of the American courts have completely rejected the
rule requiring conscious dishonesty as a basis for an action of deceit
and permit a recovery against a defendant who had no knowledge of
the falsity of his representation. 9 These courts have applied the rule
in equity to actions of deceit, thus making the legal and equitable con-
ception of fraud identical. 10 This is a rational and desirable result,
and gives a logical consistency to the law governing misrepresenta-
tion."'
Other jurisdictions have purported to follow the rule requiring
scienter, but have imposed liability for misrepresentations made with-
out knowledge of their falsity by such fictions as the imputation or
conclusive presumption of knowledge.' 2 While the result is desirable,
the use of fictions as a legal technique is not.' 3
Negligence as a Test of Liability
The most recent development in the law of misrepresentation is
tort liability for the negligent use of words. Words are a form of
voluntary behavior, and there is no good reason why, by analogy,
negligent words, as well as negligent deeds, should not be actionable
if injury proximately results from them.' 4 In cases of misrepre-
sentations, made without knowledge of their falsity, liability has quite
properly been based upon general principles of negligence, including
contributory negligence as a defense.' 5 This extension of the law of
'Gulf Elect. Co. v. Fried, 218 Ala. 684, 119 So. 685 (1929); Becker v.
McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426, 186 Pac. 496 (1920) ; Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227
Mich. 508, 198 N. W. 905 (1924), privity of contract between the parties
required; Lundy v. Hazlett, 146 Miss. 499, 112 So. 591 (1927); Donelson v.
Michelson, 104 Neb. 666, 178 S. W. 219 (1920); Bradley v. Fagula (Tex. Civ.
App.) 25 S. W. (2d) 255 (1930); Hastings v. Bain, 151 Va. 976, 145 S. E.
735 (1928); Trust Co. v. Fletcher, 152 Va. 868, 148 S. E. 785 (1929), un-
justly criticised in (1929) 16 VA. L. REv. 90, as applying the rule in equity to
an action of deceit; McDaniel v. Crahtree, 143 Wash. 168, 254 Pac. 1091(1927) ; Ohrmundt v. Spigelhoff, 175 Wis. 214, 184 N. W. 693 (1921).
(1929) 16 VA. L. REV. 90.
"Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HARv. L.
REv. 415, 434: "Consideration should be given chiefly to two things: (1) logical
consistency with itself in all parts of the law governing misrepresentation;
(2) the inherent justice of the rule proposed."
t'Fairfield Finance and Mfg. Co. v. Griffin, 144 Atl. 43 (Conn. 1928);
Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 25 So. 678 (1899) ; Williams v. Hume, 83 Ind.
App. 608, 149 N. E. 355 (1925); Horton v. Tyree, 104 W. Va. 238, 139 S. E.
737 (1927).
GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAw (2nd ed., 1927) 30, 35.
Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14 HAv. L. REv. 187.
'
1Weston v. Brown, 131 Atl. 141 (N. H. 1925) ; International Products Co.
v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927); Note (1928) 28 COT. L.
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negligence is inherently sound.16 In at least three states, this result
may be reached under statutes providing that an action of deceit will
lie for "the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true."'17
There is an authoritative basis for such a holding in North Caro-
line. In an action for damages, recovery was allowed for negligent
assurances that a message had been delivered, when in fact it had
not been delivered. It was expressly conceded that there was no
liability for failure to deliver the message in the particular case.'8 It
seems that this direct holding has never been followed.
The North Carolina Cases
North Carolina has never drawn the well established distinction,
discussed above, between actions at law for deceit and suits in equity
for rescission, as to the requirement of scienter. In both, the rule
requiring that the misrepresentations be made with knowledge of
their falsity has been followed.' 9 Although there are general state-
ments that scienter and intent to deceive are essential elements of
fraud, 20 it is well recognized that it is not always necessary for the
establishment of actionable fraud that a false representation should
be knowingly made. These cases fall in the following classes: (1)
Where reckless or positive assertions are made by one in a position
to know, and expected to know, to one who is not in an equal position
with reference to the misrepresentation, the one having a duty to in-
vestigate and the other having reasonable grounds for reliance. 2 1
REv. 216; Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 245
N. Y. 377, 157 N. E. 272 (1927) ; (1927) 41 HARv. L. REV. 105.
"
0Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42
HAv. L. REv. 733.
" MoNT. R v. CODE: (Choate, 1921) §7575; N. D. CoMp. LAWS ANN.(1913) §5944; S. D. REv. CODE (1919) §1293; Roper v. Noel, 32 S. D. 405,
143 N. W. 130 (1913), construing statute. Question is whether defendant had
reasonable ground for making representation.
" Laudie v. Tele. Co., 126 N. C. 431, 35 S. E. 810 (1900).
Tarault v. Seip, 158 N. C. 363, 74 S. E. 3 (1912) (Allen, J., in dissent-
ing opinion makes plea for the distinction) ; Bell v. Harrison, 179 N. C. 190,
102 S. E. 200 (1920) ; Ebbs v. Trust Co., supra note 1; Hinsdale v. Phillips,
199 N. C. 563 (1930) (No rescission for promissory misrepresentations honestly
made).
'Ebbs v. Trust Co., supra note 1.21Whitehurst v. Insurance Co., 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908) (insur-
ance agent's statements regarding policy to an illiterate person) ; Case Thresh-
ing Mach. Co. v. Feezer, 152 N. C. 516, 67 S. E. 1004 (1910) (statements
made by agent of manufacturer) ; Briggs v. Insurance Co., 155 N. C. 73, 70
S. E. 1068 (1911) (unequal position) ; Unitype Co. v. Ashcraft, 155 N. C. 230,
71 S. E. 61 (1911) (statements by inventor) ; Pate v. Blades, 163 N. C. 267,
79 S. E. 608 (1913) (unequal position) ; Bell v. Harrison, supra note 19 (con-
NOTES AND COMMENTS
(2) Where false statements are published by the directors as to the
condition of their bank, a duty to speak the truth is imposed.22
Conclusion
In the principal case, the defendant volunteered positive assertions
of material facts, susceptible of knowledge, with the intention that
the plaintiff act upon them. He knew neither the falsity nor the truth
of his statements. Modern artifical constructions defy detection by
the inexpert examiner. The defendant was a real estate broker, an
expert, while the plaintiff was a mere purchaser of a home. The
defendant was in position to know, and the plaintiff had reasonable
grounds to rely upon the statements of the defendant as importing
verity. It is submitted that under the North Carolina decisions,
liability should have been imposed.2 3 If the North Carolina decisions
are to be so restricted, then the requirement of scienter should be
abolished completely; or, alternatively, liability should be determined
according to the general principles of negligence, for which, our court
has a precedent in its own decisions.
J. GLENN EDWARDS.
Husband and Wfe-Torts-Right of Wife to Sue
Husband for Negligent Injury
Under married women statutes1 permitting married women to
hold all their property of every description for their separate use as
though they were unmarried and permitting them to sue and be sued
as though unmarried, it was held, in an action for personal injury
from the negligent driving of an automobile, that a wife could not
recover from her husband though the action had been started before
the marriage. 2
This would be the result at common law,3 since on marriage the
woman's choses in action may be reduced to possession by the hus-
fidential relationship); Evans v. Davis, 186 N. C. 41, 118 S. E. 845 (1923);
Corley Co. v. Griggs, 192 N. C. 171, 134 S. E. 406 (1926) (scienter not neces-
sary in all cases). But cf. Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N. C. 685, 143 S. E. 525
(1925) (no positive assertion of knowledge) ; (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 90, as
to what constitutes reasonable reliance.
'Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482 (1896) (knowledge presumed
by fiction) ; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896) ; Houston v.
Thornton, 122 N. C. 265, 29 S. E. 827 (1898) (duty to speak truth imposed).
' Supra note 21.
'D. C. CODE (1924) §§1154, 1155.
2 Spector v. Weisman, 40 F. (2d) 792 (Ct. or App. D. C. 1930).
Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (1875) ; Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436
(1876) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 309 (1877).
